The opposite of the usual case of opacity of reference

Usually you have one person referenced by two names, but someone does not know this. But there can also be a case that two different people are known by the same name, Suppose Dan is in the hospital (an in-patient) and has a therapist, named Anna. Then (after out of the hospital) Dan (who likes to dance) is at a local bar that has dancing (he only drinks water, decaf coffee, or club sods). Anyway he finds Anna goes there often (her boyfriend works there). Anyway, sometimes Anna and Dan dance. (Her boyfriend doesn’t mind – he is working). Anyway also after the hospitalization, Dan is seeing a case worker. He tells the case worker (who works from a different (out patient) location) about dancing with an Anna who used to work at that hospital (she has told Dan about changing workplaces). But the case worker thinks Dan is confused – his boss at the out patient location is Anna. (a different one), and he writes it in his report. Later, the case worker has to have some report filed. Anyway, he takes Dan to Anna’s office, Anna reads the report and is upset. (Dan never knew this Anna existed before). Anyway Anna orders the case worker to remove something (she says he should know what) from the report and shouldn’t see Dan anymore. Dan is relieved as he was seeing a psychologist anyway, as well as a psychiatrist, which were covered by his insurance. But the case worker was not covered (only Medicaid was taken & he had Medicare) , and he had to make some payments. The next time he saw his psychologist, he was told that it had been added that his case worker had talked to him about his unhealthy life style. But that was false – he had been talked about nothing like that, and had been living as healthy as he knew how for some time.

The MetaLogic of Belief

I believe I have mostly been working on the MetaLogic of belief. I have done enough that the point should be clear. Opacity does not present any problem for the reality of beliefs. But expressing our beliefs in this way is very cumbersome and so not practical, even for logic, use. Unless we agree on the meaning of words, our agreement or disagreement on beliefs expressed in their terms means nothing. Even saying one does not believe in God, or spirituality means nothing unless it is clear what one means by ‘God’ or ‘spirituality.’ But working out the minute details of a MetaLogic of belief seems not worthwhile. I agree with Fodor in “Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes” in _Representations_, “In a nutshell: intentional theories explicate knowledge structures, and knowledge structures are among the psychological mechanisms which interact in mental processes. To claim that the mental processes of an organism are a model of logic, in the sense of that notion that is now at issue, is thus not to claim that there is a belief of the organism corresponding to each theorem of the logic …. It is to claim only that the postulates of the logic are mentally represented by the organism, and that this mental representation contributes (in appropriate ways) to the causation of its beliefs.” (page 120)